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'intelligence forms of will' are enumerated as the type guided by imagination, that guided by thought; the productive, unproductive, and reproductive types of will, the independent and dependent wills, the analytic and synthetic wills.

In the last chapter, on the relation between intelligence and will, the primacy of the former is maintained. The second edition has added a criticism of Wundt for inconsistently having abandoned the doctrine of a unique will-element in his psychology, while continuing to uphold a voluntaristic metaphysics. The question as to the proper relation of intellectual and volitional elements in determining one's metaphysical attitude is answered by a strong, and to the reviewer welcome, plea against irrationalism.

It seems ungrateful to wish that a book which in its sane and practical discussions of the individual aspects of intelligence and will performs so useful a task, based this achievement on a yet deeper theoretical foundation. But one wants further light upon the nature of that 'inner assent' which is the essential feature of will; one wants to know more about the psychological character and physiological basis of those 'relations' and 'concepts' which are the peculiar material of thought processes. On the last page of the book we are told that the inner assent may be the revelation of 'an elementary active reaction of the self.' If it is to be explained by such categories, then they should be used throughout in place of psychophysical explanations. But we find that elsewhere in the book the relation of motive to act is referred to the working of the laws of association, that is, to psychophysical causes. The reviewer greatly wishes that Meumann had at least indicated the direction in which one may look for a purely psychophysical explanation of the essential features of will.

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Natural Law in Science and Philosophy. By ÉMILE BOUTROUX. Authorized Translation by FRED ROTHWELL. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. 218.

This is a series of lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in 1892–3, to the English translation of which Professor Boutroux has added a brief preface. The logical, mathematical, mechanical, physical, chemical, biological, psychological, and sociological laws are critically examined in successive chapters, and shown to be irreducible to common principles at present, and to deviate further and further from strict logical necessity. Determinism as a philosophical principle seems to be identified in Professor Boutroux's mind with logical necessity of a type that cannot be attained in formal logic itself, since even this contains elements that cannot be reduced to pure thought. With such a conception of determinism assured, it is easy for Professor Boutroux to show that in the present development of the sciences its postulation is a sheer assumption. He concludes, "that which we call the laws of nature is the sum total of the methods we have discovered for adapting things to the mind, and subjecting them to be moulded by the will" (p. 217). "The mechanical laws of nature, revealed by modern science, form in reality the chain that binds the without to the within. Instead of being a necessity, they set us free" . . . (p. 218).

Much as one may agree with Professor Boutroux's conclusions, it is to be feared that they are reached too easily to convince any of our naturalistic and mechanistic philosophers at the present time. It needs to be shown that no other form of determinism except that of logical necessity could be deduced from natural laws. This translation will furnish an excellent introductory treatise to the problems of mechanism and teleology; there is little in it, however, that has not been stated in a more thorough, though perhaps a more technical way, in recent works in English upon the subject. The translation seems on the whole to be accurate, and carefully done; possibly the influence of French rather than English diction is apparent in a few passages.

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Le rhythme du progrès. Étude sociologique. Par LOUIS WEBER. Paris, 1913—in 8°, de la Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine, Alcan.—pp. xiv, 311.

This work, following closely upon Lévy Bruhl's *Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* and Durkheim's *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, shows the productive activity of the new French sociological school, and, like the works mentioned, sets forth doctrines in the fields of comparative morals, the psychology of religion, and logic, which deserve serious consideration.

In the place of Comte's law of the three stages, which is shown to be inaccurate in its interpretation of historical progress, M. Weber proposes a rhythmic law of progress in two stages,—the first a stage of technical activity, and the second one of reflection and speculation. Evidence that civilization passes alternately through these two stages is offered from animal psychology, anthropology, and the history of the sciences. Perception, really a phase of action, appears earlier in evolution than reflective thought. Humble work, with simple tools like the coup de poing and the arrow-head, preceded the rise of systems of ideas, such as those of religion and magic. Language was the first form of theoretical technique to appear, and words and gestures may be regarded as tools invented for practical control, which at first were believed to be quasi-material objects with physical efficiency. The efficiency of words suggested a new sort of causality, and so gave rise to religion and magic. From the latter developed social institutions in general. Technical activities have their basis in individual psychology, and develop in immediate contact with the physical environment. Social, religious, magical, and other speculative ideas, on the other hand, have no external mode of verification, and owe their objectivity to collective representations and other phases of group life. M. Weber follows Durkheim and Mauss in attributing generalized concepts and categories of all sorts to social life.

That an earlier stage of technical invention has been superseded by a later era of religio-magical speculation is evident in the case of the native races of Australia and Oceanica. The evidence points to such a transition in pre-